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HEIDEGGER'S LAST GOD 
AND THE SCHELLING CONNECTION 
George J. Seidel 
Department of Philosophy 
Saint Martin's College 
RÉSUMÉ : L'article traite du thème du « dernier Dieu » dans les Beitràge zur Philosophie (Vom 
Ereignis), 1936-1938, de Heidegger. L'auteur présente d'abord un échantillon représentatif 
des vues heideggeriennes concernant Dieu et la théologie jusqu'à la publication (1989) de cet 
ouvrage très peu commun. Le « dernier Dieu » est ensuite retracé jusqu'à la première philoso-
phie de l'art de Schelling et ses leçons ultérieures de philosophie de la mythologie ainsi que de 
philosophie de la révélation. Puis les notions d'Ereignis, de Dasein, le sens de Seyn (en tant 
que distinct de Sein), le premier et l'autre commencement, sont examinés à la lumière de la 
thématique du dernier Dieu. Enfin, la Christologie que l'auteur trouve dans les Beitràge de 
Heidegger est évaluée. 
ABSTRACT : The article deals with the theme of "the last God" in Heidegger's 1936-1938 Beitràge 
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). The author first presents a representative sampling of Hei-
deggerian views regarding God and theology up to the time of the publication (1989) of this 
highly unusual work. Next, the "last God" is traced back to Schelling's early Philosophy of 
Art and later Philosophy of Mythology and Philosophy of Revelation lectures. Then, the no-
tions o/Er-eignis, Da-sein, the meaning o/Seyn (as distinct from SeinJ, the first and other be-
ginning, are examined in the light of the thematic of the last God. Finally, the Christology the 
author finds in Heidegger's Beitràge is assessed. 
W hen I was studying in Freiburg in the early 60's, I recall Werner Brock saying that the reason Americans do not understand Heidegger is that they were 
separated from discussions going on in German university circles during two world 
wars, and they are not always familiar with the philosophical tradition out of which 
Heidegger comes. Over the years I have come to appreciate the wisdom of Prof. 
Brock's remark. 
One of the important figures in the tradition for Heidegger is certainly Schelling.1 
This is particularly the case with Heidegger's Beitràge zur Philosophie {Vom Ereig-
1. In the Preface to her translation of Heidegger's Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 
Athens, Ohio University Press, 1985, Joan Stambaugh remaries that "Schelling is one of the thinkers to 
whom Heidegger has the most affinity." In The Finitude of Being, Albany, SUNY, 1992, p. 72, she sug-
gests that Schelling's appeal for Heidegger lies in the fact that not everything, especially when it comes to 
God, can be explained rationally. Special thanks go to J. and K. Byron for looking over the manuscript, 
making suggestions for its improvement, and checking the proofs ; and to an anonymous francophone 
reader regarding dates of works in Schelling's later philosophy. 
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nis), Contributions to Philosophy : Concerning the Event,2 specifically in relation to 
the theme of the last God (der letzte Gott) prominent in that work. In an earlier piece, 
which emphasized the connection between Heidegger and his erstwhile fellow Mar-
burger Rudolf Bultmann, I argued that the Beitràge contains Heidegger's Christol-
ogy,3 and went on to describe the difficulties that any Heideggerian "Christology" 
would necessarily labor under. Exposing the "Schelling connection," I hope, will 
both broaden and reinforce that earlier interpretation. 
I 
Before turning to Schelling, it might be well to indicate some of Heidegger's ex-
press views regarding religion and theology. No attempt is made to include every 
passage in Heidegger's works where he mentions God or theology. Rather, a repre-
sentative sampling is provided to indicate, if only by way of contrast, why the Bei-
tràge represents such a remarkable work in the Heideggerian corpus. 
In a work published in 1963, concerning his relation to phenomenology, Heideg-
ger writes that after four semesters he gave up the study of theology (toward ordina-
tion to the Catholic priesthood) in order to devote himself to philosophy. He adds that 
already in 1911 he had begun to see that the strained relations (Spannung) between 
ontology and speculative theology were caused by metaphysics.4 
What metaphysics means for Heidegger, as differentiated from ontology, be-
comes clear in Being and Time, where, at the end of the Introduction, he calls for a 
"destructuring" of the history of ontology. Part of what this means is that God must 
be gotten out of metaphysics, in the same way that metaphysics must be gotten out of 
theology. Heidegger indicated this in a work he published on Hegel's metaphysics in 
1957, dealing with the way in which God gets into philosophy as the essence (Wesen) 
of metaphysics. After all, he argues, one cannot worship a causa sui (the "God" of 
Spinoza), nor can one pray to it or fall down on one's knees before it, or dance and 
make music to it.5 
At first sight this may appear to be but the old saw about the difference between 
the God of religion and the gods of the philosophers. But it is more. It is also the 
burden of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's assertion that "God is dead." The 
metaphysical "God" of a Hegel or a Spinoza must be sacrificed. The God Nietzsche 
declares deceased, the "God" of the "supersensible ground" or the "goal of the real," 
must be given a pious burial. 
Already in 1927, before a group of theological students at Tubingen, Heidegger 
had argued that theology, as a positive science based upon revelation and historical 
2. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 65, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1989. Henceforth : Beitràge. 
3. "A Key to Heidegger's Beitràge" Gregorianum,76, 2 (1995), p. 363-372. 
4. Cf. "My Way to Phenomenology," in Martin HEIDEGGER, On Time and Being, tr. J. Stambaugh, New 
York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 75. 
5. Martin HEIDEGGER, Identity and Difference, tr. J. Stambaugh, New York, Harper and Row, 1969, p. 71-72. 
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occurrence, is, as such, absolutely distinct from philosophy.6 He goes on to charac-
terize what is termed Christian philosophy as "wooden iron," a contradiction in 
terms. Indeed, in the 1949 introduction prefixed to the fifth edition of What is Meta-
physics ? Heidegger asks rhetorically : When will Christian theology finally decide to 
take seriously Paul's words (1 Corinthians 1:20) concerning the foolishness of the 
wisdom of this world, namely philosophy ?7 
On the other hand, in a 19 August 1921 letter to Karl Lôwith Heidegger describes 
himself as a "Christian theologian."* Of course, the emphasis is on the word "logos" 
and with it the rich connotations this word has in Heidegger's thought, from his 
Heraclitus interpretations on.9 
In his Letter on Humanism (1947), Heidegger asks what being is, and answers 
that it is simply itself. It is not God, nor is it the ground of the world (Weltgrund). He 
adds that to proclaim God simply as the "highest value" is little short of blasphemy.10 
Still, in the 1929 work On the Essence of Ground, he noted that although the inter-
pretation of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world makes no decision either for, or against, 
the possible existence of God ; nevertheless, perhaps by clarifying the meaning of 
Dasein's transcendence it may be possible to inquire how the relation of Dasein to 
God is ontologically constituted.11 
However, when one understands what the Freiburg philosopher means by the 
word "transcendence," that is, a "standing out" (ekstatisches) of what is "standing in" 
(Innestehen) the world,12 one may wonder whether there is really anything like 
transcendence in Heidegger at all, certainly in any traditional sense. Still, in a Pro-
seminar he held in Zurich with Professor Spoerri in 1951, Heidegger does intimate 
that his thought concerning the meaning of being might be helpful in preparing the 
way for a new theology. This would not imply attempting to think God by means of 
(durch) being ; rather, he suggests, were he to write a theology, the word being would 
not even appear in it. Faith, he says, has no need of the thought of being, for then it 
would no longer be faith. Luther knew this, says Heidegger, his church seems to have 
forgotten it.13 With Kant, Heidegger agrees that the word being is simply not a possi-
ble predicate for God. 
6. Martin HEIDEGGER, Phânomenologie und Théologie, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1956, p. 218. 
7. Cf. Walter KAUFMANN, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, Cleveland, Meridian, 1956, p. 218. 
8. Quoted in Theodore KlSIEL, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1993, cf. p. 7,78, 287. 
9. Cf. G.J. SEIDEL, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratic's, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1964, 
p. 87-105. 
10. Martin HEIDEGGER, "Letter on Humanism," in Basic Writings, D.F. Krell, éd., New York, Harper & Row, 
1977, p. 228. 
11. Martin HEIDEGGER, The Essence of Reasons, tr. T. Malick, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 
1969, p. 91, n. 56. 
12. Cf. Martin HEIDEGGER, "Letter on Humanism," in op. cit., p. 233. 
13. I am unaware whether this has been published or not. I typed a copy of it from a transcript circulating in 
Freiburg when I was there in the early 1960's. 
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One can see that Heidegger takes something of the same view regarding the strict 
separation between speculative philosophy and religion as does Kierkegaard ; so 
much so, that it is difficult to imagine how theology, in any traditional sense, could 
be undertaken on Heidegger's terms. For he notes that Christian theology with its 
doctrine on Creation, takes one of the basic principles of philosophical speculation, 
"From nothing comes nothing" (Ex nihilo nihil fit), and turns it into "From nothing 
comes created being" (Ex nihilo fit ens creatum).14 
One may, perhaps, be inclined to agree, for philosophical as well as for theologi-
cal reasons, that God should be extricated from metaphysics, certainly if Hegel's 
"onto-theology" is taken as the model. However, it is difficult to imagine how theol-
ogy might radically expunge the word being from its vocabulary, that is, if theology 
would want to say anything about Creation. Further, some form of the verb "to be" 
would have to be employed in relation to God, the principal subject matter of theol-
ogy. Indeed, for Heidegger God is not being ; nor is Dasein "being." The latter is 
simply openness to the "it gives" (es gibt) of being, as Heidegger puts it in his 1962 
lecture Time and Being}5 Perhaps, Heidegger has gotten God out of metaphysics. But 
then the difficulty with any Heideggerian ontology, totally lacking anything like a 
traditional notion of essence, is how to determine the meaning of being. 
Heidegger may, perhaps, have begun to sense this difficulty. For in a writing 
published in 1962, concerning the switch (Die Kehre) his thought took in the 1930's 
over his inability to find the language to complete the proposed plan of Being and 
Time, he writes : 
Whether God lives or remains dead, is not decided by human religiosity, still less by the 
theological aspirations of philosophy and science. Whether God is God happens out of, 
and within, the situation of being.16 
In other words, the position one takes regarding being, even if it should not influence 
theological considerations as such, is not without its possible bearing upon the kind 
of God that would be thought, and hence upon the way in which theology would be 
done. 
Heidegger may be willing to grant that some form of the verb "to be" might have 
to find its way into theological considerations, but certainly not a form of the verb "to 
exist." Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between being and 
existence. He must do so in order to avoid what he regards as the traditional meta-
physical approach to being, which would attempt to define human being in terms of 
the categories of non-human being. By this move he would also attempt to avoid the 
trap into which Feuerbach inadvertently slipped, namely that of trying to define the 
human in terms of nature, while defining nature in terms of the human. Thus, Hei-
degger notes that the only being that can be said to "exist," open-stanced in the truth 
of being, is Dasein. The rock is, but does not exist. The same is true of the tree, the 
14. Martin HEIDEGGER, "What is Metaphysics ?" in op. cit., p. 107-108. 
15. Martin HEIDEGGER, On Time and Being, p. 5ff. 
16. Martin HEIDEGGER, Die Technik und die Kehre, Pfullingen, Neske, 1962, p. 46. 
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horse, the angel, and God as well. In saying that God is, but does not exist, Heidegger 
adds that it should not thereby be imagined that God, like any of the other things that 
are — but which do not exist — is somehow unreal, or a mere idea (Vorstellung) of 
the human being.17 
The limitation of Heidegger's own thinking can be easily discerned in a brief es-
say written in 1964 on the problem of the verifiability of theological and religious 
language.18 The question is approached and resolved, or better, dissolved, in typical 
Heideggerian fashion. It is simply the wrong question. Theology is not a natural 
science. The verifiability of non-objectifying (nichtobjektivierenden) thought and 
language is a problem, in Heidegger's opinion, only if one views thought as repre-
sentation (vorstellen) ; in which case one would have to view art, for example, as 
equally non-objectifying and unverifiable. Similarly, it is a problem only if language 
is taken as simply the product of human beings. And as the philosopher has insisted 
in earlier works, it is primordially language that speaks, not the human being. Human 
beings come to speak only to the extent that language speaks in and through them. 
The above represents Heidegger's views on religion and theology up until the 
publication, in 1989, of the Beitràge, a work written between 1936 and 1938, shortly 
after — significantly I think — he had delivered a course of lectures on Schelling's 
On the Essence of Human Freedom. Before examining the Beitrage, however, it 
might be well to turn to the Schelling of the Schelling connection. 
II 
Obviously, it is not possible to do a complete reread of Schelling,19 even of those 
areas of Schelling's philosophy that appear to find their way into Heidegger's 
thought. Rather, I will confine myself to those parts of Schelling that throw light 
upon the theme of the last God in the Beitràge. 
Central to Schelling's interests is his philosophy of art. In this respect he is very 
much the romantic philosopher. Drawing upon the philosophy of Spinoza (Nature 
naturing, Nature natured), Schelling insists that the self-affirming being of God 
expresses itself in nature.20 The task of the artist, as he says in his 1802-1803 lectures 
at Jena on the Philosophy of Art, is that of "imaging" the infinite into (In-einsbildung) 
the finite in and through the artist's creative imagination (Einbildungskraft, S Win, 
406 ; cf. also IV, 24). In this sense, all art is but the outpouring (Ausflufi) of the 
Absolute (SW III, 392). God is the absolute cause of all art (SW m, 479). It repre-
17. Martin HEIDEGGER, Was ist Metaphysik ?, 7th éd., Frankfurt am Main, 1955, p. 15-16. 
18. Martin HEIDEGGER, "Das Problem eines nightobjektivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen 
Théologie," in Phanomenologie und Théologie, p. 37-46. 
19. For this one may consult G.J. SEIDEL, Activity and Ground : Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Hildesheim, 
Olms, 1976, p. 89-137. 
20. Schellings Werke, M. Schrôter, éd., Munchen, Beck, 1958, III, 399. Henceforth : SW, with volume and 
page numbers cited in the text. The supplementary volumes (Erganzungsbande) will be cited with Arabic 
numerals. 
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sents the Absolute producing its being (Wesen), but symbolically (zum Symbol, 
SW III, 480-482, 502). The work of art, like the Christ, represents the infinite in the 
finite. The difference between the two, he will say later, is that in art the imaging of 
the infinite in the finite is relative, and not absolute (SW HI, 501). Christ represents 
the apex (Gipfel) of the divine become human, and hence is the human become 
divine. 
In Christ, rather, the finite is symbolized in and through (durch) the infinite as the latter 
by the former [...] so as to lead the finite into the infinite (SW III, 451-452). 
This is the essential difference, in Schelling's view, between Christianity and the 
pagan mythologies or the art produced by the Greek imagination : in Christianity not 
only is the infinite imaged in the finite, the finite is taken up into the infinite. 
For Schelling, the symbolic is where both the general and the particular are ab-
solute. Some examples of the symbolic are : art, philosophy (from the standpoint of 
arithmetic or geometry), sculpture, and drama. In the domain of the religious, Maria 
is the symbol of the "eternal woman." In the gospels there are symbolic actions : the 
baptism in the Jordan, the Last Supper. The church and its liturgy are symbolic. 
Angels are symbols of good and evil. Indeed, any seeing of the infinite in the finite is 
a symbolic endeavor (SW III, 427-467 ; on angels cf. p. 357). The symbolical, as art 
generally, is tied up with Schelling's rich notion of the potencies (Potenzen), which, 
in the Philosophy of Mythology, will be tied into what he terms the théogonie process, 
whereby the histories or stories of the Gods (Gôttergeschichte) actually come to be in 
consciousness. The potencies represent the content implied or involved in this proc-
ess. 
It is in this context that the phrase "the last God" (der letzte Gott) occurs in 
Schelling (SW III, 452). He insists that the divine becoming human differs in pagan-
ism and in Christianity. In the latter there is a finitude that has fallen away from God 
which, in the person of the Christ, is reconciled with God through an annihilation 
(Vernichtung) of that fallen finitude. Drawing upon the notion of kenosis, from 
Philippians 2:6-8 — God emptying himself out, taking the form of servant, etc. — 
Schelling says that in self-sacrificing his infinitude it is as if (als ob) Christ puts an 
end to the old time (alten Zeii), the old world of the pagan Gods : Christ is simply 
there to set the limit : the last God. God is the apex {Gipfel), and the end, of the old 
world of the Gods. 
Thus, while earlier acknowledging the greatness of Greek religion and poetry, 
Schelling insists that "the last God" represents the end of the old world, a world 
tragically fated to pass away with Christianity. God become human, the infinite in the 
finite, is the end of the old world of the Gods (SW III, 312-314). It looks forward to 
(Vorsehung), and prepares for, a new age. The new age is that of the Spirit, the ideal 
principle, the dominant soul of the new world (SW III, 452). 
In his Philosophy of Mythology, lectures given at Berlin in 1842 (though earlier 
in Munich, in 1827 and 1831), Schelling examines in greater detail the meaning of 
myth. The histories or stories of the Gods (Gôttergeschichte) represent a théogonie 
process, that is, it is a subjective process. Still, although mythology naturally repre-
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sents a God-positing on the part of consciousness,21 the question "How does con-
sciousness come to God ?" is, in his view, the wrong question. Rather, the first 
motion comes from God, representing an event that is above and beyond history 
(iibergeschichtliches Ereignis, SW VI, 188, 193). In other words, although the proc-
ess is subjective the content of the process is the potencies (Potenzen), which are the 
actual and in themselves théogonie powers.22 Schelling will later speak of the Christ 
as a cosmic power (kosmische Potenz, SWVI, 251). Schelling sees Christ as the 
eternal mediator between the divine and the human. Christ (Christianity) is older than 
the world, in the world before the world is (SW VI, 579). Such théogonie powers, 
again, have an objective meaning, not merely a subjective one (SW VI, 348). Thus, it 
is not the divine Self that is in consciousness, but only a mirror-image (Gleichbild) of 
it. Further, it has a meaning that is not only religious but a general one as well 
(SWVI, 214, 218). 
When Schelling comes to the monotheism section of the Philosophy of Mythol-
ogy, he speaks of God as being itself (Seyende selbst) ; this is the basis for God's 
uniqueness. God is not Seyn, but the general possibility of being (Seyn, SW VI, 
28Iff.). It is in this sense that God's essence is his existence (Seyn) ; which essence is 
"to-be" (seyn wird). This accords with Schelling's rendering of God's reply to Moses 
in Exodus 3:14, the "name" of God : "I will be what I will be." It is the freedom or 
existence (the authentic) side of God that overcomes the ground or nature side of 
God, as Schelling sets this up in his On the Essence of Human Freedom. And because 
that existence is free, he maintains that it is outside being. God is the immediate can-
be (unmittelbar Seyn-konnende). This is not some mere passive potentiality, but the 
actual can-be of an active will (SW VI, 287-293). It is Spirit, the can-be of the divine 
ground as the beginning of its being (Anfang seines Seyns).23 
The themes touched upon in Schelling's earlier works come to theological frui-
tion in his Philosophy of Revelation (lectures given at Berlin in 1842, again in 
1845/1846, and previously from 1831 on). One thing new in the later Schelling is that 
he transfers the nature or ground (the dark side) of God, as set up in On the Essence 
of Human Freedom, to the bad angels (SW VI, 676 ; cf. also 633ff.). One item of 
interest, in relation to Heidegger, is the way Schelling defines faith : it is to take as 
true (fur wahr zu halten, SW VI, 409). Heidegger uses the same phrase to describe 
faith in the Beitràge.24 Schelling refers to the New Testament as a new and second 
creation, not an event (Ereignis) that had to happen by necessity, but the manifesta-
tion of the most free and personal will of God, an extra-ordinary event (SW VI, 403-
404, 416). The "first beginning" is creation (SW VI, 498) — or is it the Seyn that is 
the Father as the source and principle of the divinity (fans et principium divinitatis) ? 
At any rate, the second beginning is the Son, who possesses Seyn, the appearance of 
the second potency (Erscheinung der zweiten Potenz) ; this is a new process and one 
21. "[...] natiirlich Gott-Setzenden des BewuBtseyns [...]" (SW VI, 247). 
22. "[...] die wirklich und an sich theogonischen Mâchte [...]" (SW VI, 209). 
23. SW VI, 297-298. As Schelling will say later, God is essentially freedom (SW VI, 504). 
24. Beitrdge, p. 368-369. 
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in human consciousness.25 This Seyn, he insists, is outside the Father, the Father as 
the "substance" for the Seyn of the Son (SW VI, 442, 452). Indeed, the Son is so 
completely God that God (Father) would not be God without the Son (SW VI, 504). 
Nevertheless, although the first beginning is creation, the Logos is there in the 
beginning (SW VI, 554). The beginning is an eternal one, neither before nor outside 
the end (complete Spirit), the end neither before nor outside the beginning. Thus, the 
beginning should be thought as there with the end, and the end as there v/ith the 
beginning (SW 6, 259). In other words, as Schelling says later : "The beginning of 
creation is also the beginning of the generation (Zeugung, or testimony) of the Son" 
(SW 6, 323). This is, again, the eternal cosmic Christ. 
In the Philosophy of Revelation, Schelling devotes some time and effort to an 
exegesis of the Prologue to the gospel of John (SW VI, 481-510) — seemingly de 
rigueur for the German idealist philosophers — as also an exegesis of Philippians 
2:6-8 (SW VI, 431-442, 554-557). What he does, however, is to read John's Prologue 
from the perspective of the kenosis theme in Philippians. Heidegger follows a similar 
pattern in the Beitrâge. In this context Schelling criticizes Fichte's view of the Johan-
nine Logos as merely in knowledge (blofi im Wissen).26 Schelling, on the other hand, 
takes the phrase "in the form of God" found in Philippians 2, reading it, in conjunc-
tion with the Johannine Logos, as a being outside-the-divine divine-being (aufier-
gôttlich-gottliche Seyn), the Godhead hidden (SW VI, 557). The Christ is the "eternal 
mediator," his birth a final, but entirely external, event (Ereignifi), fully present in the 
circle of other external givens.27 Schelling has the Christ as a mediator, indeed, as 
very much an "intermediary being," since Christ is outside God in virtue of his 
eternal humanity, outside and independent of the human in virtue of his divinity 
25. SW VI, 429-431. The Potenzen are always connected with consciousness in Schelling, cf. SW 6, 65. The 
third potency is, of course, the Spirit (SW VI, 457). This sets up the three time periods in Schelling : before 
creation, the time of the Father ; the present, the time of the Son ; the future, that of the Spirit (SW VI, 
463). 
26. SW VI, 493-494. For a consideration of the Fichtean Logos, cf. G.J. SEIDEL, "The Atheism Controversy of 
1799 and the Christology of Fichte's Anweisung zum seligen Leben of 1806," in New Perspectives on 
Fichte, New York, Humanities Press, 1995, p. 143-151. Fichte gives a specifically theological, not to say 
Christological, significance to the distinction between Seyn, as expressing absolute being (the Father) and 
Daseyn, determinate being or actual existence (Son). Thus, in his exegesis of the Prologue to John's gospel 
he says, "[...] the consciousness of being (Seyn), the Is relative to being, is immediately Daseyn" (Fichte's 
sammtliche Werke, J.H. Fichte, éd., Berlin, Veit, 1845, V, 439-441) ; the Logos is the image of the absolute 
being (Wesen) in the actual world (cf. ibid., V, 526). Fichte gets this distinction between Seyn and Daseyn 
from Schelling, cf. Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), though in this early work of Schelling's 
the orientation is primarily ethical (like the early Fichte), Daseyn in every age striving to posit itself as pure 
Seyn ; the infinite task of practical reason is to make the absolute being and empirical existence (Daseyn) 
identical (SW I, 133-134, with notes). In the Philosophy of Revelation, Schelling indicates an awareness of 
Fichte's Anweisung (SW 6, 53). 
27. "Diese Geburt ist ein letztes, aber vôllig àuBeres, ganz in den Kreis anderer âuBerer Begebenheiten 
eintretendes EreigniB" (SW VI, 565). Schelling argues that Christ's resurrection is proof of the irrevocabil-
ity of the Incarnation (SW VI, 609). 
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(SW VI, 617). For Schelling, then, the Christ is neither, strictly speaking, divine nor 
human, but something in between.28 
Ill 
The subtitle of Beitràge zur Philosophy is Worn Ereignis (Concerning the Event). 
However, the word Ereignis has rich connotations in the Heideggerian vocabulary. In 
Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology there is no special meaning attached to the word 
Ereignis. When he comes to the Philosophy of Revelation, however, the word does 
take on a special meaning.29 In Heidegger's Beitràge the word is often hyphenated 
(Er-eignis), to indicate that he wishes it taken in its deeper etymological sense. Thus, 
the event is an eye-opener (er-augen, open up one's eyes to). The word is also made 
to relate to an-eignen and zu-eignen, which mean make one's own, take to oneself, 
ap-propriate. In this connection he uses the neologism Er-eignung to indicate that 
Seyn determines that human beings should become the property (Eigentum) of Seyn 
(Beitràge, p. 263) as a result of their encounter with (Ent-gegnung), and decision for 
(Ent-scheidung), Da-sein, the "being" that is very much "there." 
The encountering of the divine and the human occurs in this Er-eignung (Bei-
tràge, p. 477). And Da-sein — the word is generally hyphenated in this work — is 
the "in between" (das Zwischen) between the human and the divine.30 Thus, in the 
Beitràge Heidegger speaks of Da-sein as the Between (das Zwischen) in between the 
human, as the basis for history, and the divine, in its history (Beitràge, p. 311). Seyn 
is the "in between" between the divine and the human.31 As noted above, a similar 
position is adopted by Schelling in his Philosophy of Revelation : the Christ is neither 
divine nor human but something in between.32 
Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between Sein and Seyn in the Beitràge, a 
new sort of "ontological difference." The distinction is in keeping with his earlier 
stated program to get being (Sein) out of theology and being (Seyn) out of metaphys-
ics. If I am reading Heidegger correctly, he uses the older spelling for being (Seyn) to 
refer to the divine being in Da-sein, as distinct from the human being-there as what is 
first grasped (Vorgriff, Beitràge, p. 317). The distinction Fichte made between Seyn 
(God) and Daseyn (Christ), with its background in Schelling, was noted above (cf. 
28. SW VI 577-578. Which position Xavier TlLLlETTE (Le Christ de la philosophie. Prolégomènes à une 
christologie philosophique, Paris, Cerf, 1990, p. 160) dubs modalist, the view that distinctions within the 
Godhead are only transitory. 
29. SW VI, 404, 565. In an earlier piece, "A Key to Heidegger's Beitràge" I cited Bultmann in this connec-
tion. In his commentary on John's gospel, Bultmann speaks of the Logos of the Prologue as the Ereignis 
(Das Evangelium des Johannes, 18 éd., Gôttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964 [reprint of the 1941, 
10th éd.], p. 7) ; the judgment of the world (Weltgericht), the eschatologische Ereignis, is implicit in that 
event (ibid., p. 111). 
30. Beitràge, p. 311. In his commentary on John's gospel Bultmann also sees the Christ as the Zwischenwesen 
(Das Evangelium des Johannes, p. 12). 
31. Beitràge, p. 470-471. Seyn is the Between in the midst of beings and the Gods, and, from that perspective, 
incomparable, "needed" by the latter, hidden from the former (ibid., p. 244). 
32. SW VI, 577-578. 
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footnote 26). However, Heidegger parts company with both Schelling and Fichte 
when he says that it is impossible to get to Seyn from the understanding of Sein that 
derives from human subjectivity (Beitràge, p. 259). Da-sein represents the overcom-
ing of all subjectivity.33 
Heidegger goes along with Schelling in believing that there is no rational ap-
proach to God, above all when it comes to the meaning of Da-sein. Heidegger, 
however, would go further and remove the element of consciousness and subjectivity 
entirely from Schelling's théogonie process. When it comes to the meaning of the last 
God, he says, all scientific knowledge is impossible, and dialectic will be of no avail 
(Beitràge, p. 407-412). This may remind one of Kierkegaard's objections to 
Hegelianism in the Philosophical Fragments, and the necessity of a leap of faith 
relative to the Paradox. No reason, says Heidegger, can be given for the revelation 
(Wesung) that is Seyn (Beitràge, p. 509). Indeed, there is a Kierkegaardian, as well as 
a Schellingian, connection in Heidegger's Beitràge. Thus, he insists that there is no 
direct road leading from the Sein of things to Seyn, since the viewpoint of the being 
of things is outside the Augenblicklichkeit of Dasein (Beitràge, p. 75). One may again 
hear echoes from Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments : the moment of faith 
relating to the moment that was the Paradox (the infinite in the finite) "in the mo-
ment." 
In the "Monotheism" section of his Philosophy of Mythology, Schelling speaks of 
God as being itself (das Seyende selbst), but not as Seyn, since the essence of God is 
"to-be" (seyn wird), which "to-be" is, as such, outside being (Seyn). Heidegger, on 
the other hand, insists that God is not a being (ein Seiendes) least of all the highest 
being (das Seiendeste, Beitràge, p. 472). Likewise for Heidegger, God is not to be 
identified with Seyn ; rather, Seyn reveals itself tempo-spatially (zeit-râumlich) as the 
Between ; which "in between" is never grounded in God, nor in the human, as some-
thing living and at hand, but instead in Da-sein (Beitràge, p. 263). As the "in be-
tween" between the human and the divine there occurs with Da-sein an Ent-gegnung, 
the encountering of the divine and the human in the appropriation (Er-eignung) of the 
human by the divine (Beitràge, p. 311, 477). "Making this truth one's own" (ap-
propriation) is, from the human side, Heidegger's description of faith : knowledge of 
the essential (Das wesentliche Wissen). Faith for Heidegger, as for Schelling, is Fiir-
wahr-halten : holding onto what is taken as true.34 As suggested above, Heidegger 
uses the word Seyn to refer to the divine being in Da-sein. Again, this represents the 
newer version of the "ontological difference," which, he maintains, grounds the 
earlier one in his thought.35 Das Seyn west, he says, das Seiende "/sf."36 Again, for 
33. Beitràge, p. 303. The relation between Da-sein and das Seyn is not a subject-object relationship (Beitràge, 
p. 254). In the recently published 1929 summer semester lectures, Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schel-
ling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 28, Frankfurt am 
Main : Klostermann, 1997, Heidegger criticizes the subjectivism of German idealism as a continuation of 
Cartesian subjectivism (p. 130, 271). 
34. Beitràge, p. 368-369. Earlier in "Phànomenologie und Théologie," p. 52-53, Heidegger had described faith, 
in typically Johannine fashion, as Wiedergeburt in and through der gekreuzigte Gott. 
35. "[...] das Seiende is grounded in the Wesung des Seyns and has its origin therein" (Beitràge, p. 465). Is this 
the "all things were created through the Word" of John's Prologue ? 
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Heidegger God is not Seyn ; rather, Seyn "west" spatio-temporally as the "in be-
tween" (Beitràge, p. 263). And how does it "west ?" It "west" as a bold and risky 
venture (Wagnis), it "west" as the "in between" (Beitràge, p. 475-476). It represents a 
leap (Sprung), a risky venturing forth (Wagnis), into the being's history (Seins-
geschichte)?1 The verb "west" derives its meaning, I think, from another of Heideg-
ger's neologisms — so far as I am aware peculiar to this work — namely Wesung, a 
word found at the beginning of the work, at the end, and throughout. He speaks of the 
Ereignis as the Wesung des Seyns (Beitràge, p. 7). Also, he speaks of Wesung as the 
Sagen "des" Seyns, where "des" is a genitive of a peculiar sort. Wesung, I would 
suggest, is simply Bultmann's Offenbarung, revelation, what Seyn does when it 
"west" The "of" Seyn's bespeaking (Sagen) is of a peculiar sort in that the Logos is 
not only the revelation "of God, it is that revelation. In other words, what Seyn does 
when it "west" in the Er-eignis is reveal itself : "In the revelation of the truth of 
Being, in the Event and as the Event, is hidden the last God."38 Again, the genitive is 
a peculiar one in that not only is the Event the revelation of Seyn, it is, or better, 
reveals itself in, and as, that revelation, Da-sein, standing in the openness of beings 
(Beitràge, p. 217). The last God. 
Another leitmotif of Contributions is contained in the phrase Wesung der Lich-
tung des Sichverbergens : Da-sein, as the revealing of the clearing for self-
concealing, belongs to this self-concealing which reveals itself as the Event (Bei-
tràge, p. 297). Da-sein as the other beginning represents a unique being (einzigartiges 
Seiendes, Beitràge, p. 296). Like Schelling, Heidegger reads John's Prologue through 
the eyes of Philippians (2:6-8) : Heidegger speaks of the original revelation as a total 
break (Zerkliiftung), revealing itself in the moment of the leaping forth of Da-sein in 
(or into) the Event.39 
Another of the important themes in Beitràge, also sounded in Schelling, is the 
distinction Heidegger draws early on between the "first beginning" and the "other 
beginning." The first beginning represents the truth of beings. The reaction is one of 
wonder (Er-staunen) ; philosophy begins with wonder (Plato, Aristotle). The other 
beginning experiences the truth of being (Wahrheit des Seyns), inquiring about the 
being of truth (Seyn der Wahrheit), a truth that gradually dawns on one (Er-ahnen, 
Beitràge, p. 179). In Heidegger, as in Schelling and the German idealists generally, 
36. Beitràge, p. 472. According to Heidegger, it is not possible to inquire into the truth of Seyn (ibid., p. 449), 
even though it is eminently question-worthy (Frag-wurdig, ibid., p. 413). Indeed, for Bultmann it is the 
question : "Who are you ?" (Das Evangelium des Johannes, p. 165), and the answer is the egô eimi (I am) 
of John's gospel, which, I submit, is precisely the meaning of Seyn in Heidegger's Beitràge. Da-sein is the 
truth of Seyn that is in play, and well worth asking about (Beitràge, p. 313). Again, this is not a matter of 
the truth of the being (Sein) of beings (the old metaphysics), but of the truth of Seyn (ibid., p. 428). The 
truth of Seyn is not a metaphysical question : Das Seyn ist das Er-eignis (ibid., p. 470) ; in the face of Da-
sein metaphysics remains simply clueless (p. 472). 
37. Beitràge, p. 227-228. And drawing upon the notion of leap (of faith) in Kierkegaard, Heidegger says that 
there is a corresponding human leap into (Einsprung) Da-sein (ibid., p. 417). 
38. "In der Wesung der Wahrheit des Seyns, im Ereignis und als Ereignis, verbirgt der letzte Gott" (Beitràge, 
p. 24). 
39. "[...] offnet sich nur in der Augenblicklichkeit des Vor-sprungs des Da-seins in das Ereignis" (Beitràge, 
p. 75). 
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creation (the first beginning) and the incarnation (the other beginning) are closely 
linked. Heidegger speaks of the "other beginning" as the echo (Anklang) of the "first 
beginning." This may account for the meaning of Anklang in the Beitràge (cf. 
p. 107ff.). Thus, he says that the transcendence of Dasein in Being and Time is not 
the same as the transcendence of the creator {Schopfer). (We will leave aside whether 
there is any real transcendence in Being and Time.) At any rate, Heidegger insists that 
the creator's transcendence totally disappears in Dasein (Beitràge, p. 217). 
As suggested above, in this tradition the tie up between creation and incarnation 
occurs in virtue of the idealist exegesis of the Prologue to John's gospel. In his Phi-
losophy of Revelation, Schelling insists that beginning and end, end and beginning, 
should be thought of as coterminous : "The beginning of creation is also the begin-
ning of the testimony of the Son."40 Similarly in Heidegger, the last God is the end of 
the other beginning. However, it is an end in the sense of an "And so forth," the 
ultimate commencement (das Anfànglichste von Anfang an, Beitràge, p. 411, 416). 
As Heidegger says, the Being-unto-death of Dasein does not end in nothing. Rather 
the opposite ; it opens up from the beyond (aus dem Àufiersten) the openness of Seyn. 
In this context death is not merely the outermost possibility of the Da (of Dasein), 
but the inmost possibility of its complete transformation (Beitràge, p. 283, 325). The 
intrinsic finitude of Seyn reveals itself in the beckoning (Wink) of the last God. No 
un-loosing (Er-losung) occurs here ; rather, there is the grounding of Dasein in Seyn 
itself, the "belonging to" of the human in Seyn through the (last) God. It is this that 
sets up the conflict between the passing by of the last God and human history.41 
In Schelling the last God spells the end of the old world of the Gods. With the 
God become human, the infinite in the finite — so that the finite might become 
infinite — the old world of the Gods is tragically fated to pass away. Likewise, in 
Heidegger there is a flight of the Gods that have been (gewesenen Gotter) from their 
positions of dominance (Beitràge, p. 408. Cf. also p. 235-237). We do not know the 
laws according to which such must have occurred. There is the necessary element of 
mystery involved in the eventful event (Er-eignung), in the revelation (Wesung) of 
Seyn. However, Heidegger insists that the Wesung des Seyns is not itself the last God. 
Rather, this revelation grounds the hiding through which the creative power of God 
comes through (das Seyn durchgottet) in word and sacrifice, thought and deed (Bei-
tràge, p. 262). In Dasein's urgent standing in (Instdndigkeit) there is also a holding 
back (Verhaltenheit) : the silence of the passing by of the last God (Beitràge, p. 406). 
There is one significant difference — theologically a significant one — between 
Schelling and Heidegger on the score of the future. For Schelling the last God looks 
forward to, and prepares for, a new age. The new world is that of the Spirit, the 
dominant soul of the new world. One hears no such voice in Heidegger. Rather, what 
40. SW 6, p. 259, 323. 
41. Beitràge, p. 410, 413. The word Erlôsung has the obvious religious and theological meaning of redemption 
or salvation. However, Heidegger hyphenates the word, indicating that he wishes it understood in some 
more original sense. I am unsure what that original sense is. 
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sounds concerning what is coming (Zu-kunftigen) is the Spenglerian note : "Our age 
is one of decline" (Beitràge, p. 397). 
According to Heidegger, knowledge, dialectic, system ("The period of the 'sys-
tem' is past," Beitràge, p. 5), etc., will not get us to the truth of Seyn. Nor can histori-
cal criticism (Historié) get at the true history (Geschichte) of Seyn as Event (Beitràge, 
p. 494) ; it cannot get at the "in between" (Zwischen) of the true history of this en-
counter between-the divine and the human (Beitràge, p. 479). Although Schelling 
may speak of the théogonie Ereignis as supra-historical (ubergeschichtliches, SW VI, 
193), one suspects that Heidegger's references here are more to the distinction drawn 
between Geschichte and Historié in Being and Time, as it is exemplified in the exis-
tential exegetical method of Bultmann. 
IV 
Toward the end of his Philosophy of Revelation Schelling offers that he has no 
particular interest in appearing orthodox ; his interest is in explaining the phenome-
non of Christianity (SW VI, 593). Similarly, Heidegger's Christology in the Beitràge 
— if I am correct in my reading — is certainly not a traditional one. Neither Heideg-
ger nor Schelling speak of the two natures in Christ. In Schelling's case the word 
nature is just another word for Spirit, hence it can hardly be used in a contrast be-
tween divine and human natures. Heidegger, on the other hand, totally deconstructs 
the Greek notion of nature (physis) so that it cannot really be used in a theological 
context. 
The two philosophers deal with the issue of Christology in terms of the philo-
sophical positions they have previously laid out. Thus, Schelling's presentation rests 
heavily upon the notion of théogonie powers, and the tie up this has with conscious-
ness and subjectivity, even though he insists that the théogonie powers or potencies 
have an objective, and not merely a subjective, meaning. For Heidegger, there is still 
too much subjectivity involved in such a position. 
Both Heidegger and Schelling look upon the Christ as an intermediary being. For 
Schelling, the Christ is outside God in virtue of his humanity, independent of the 
human in virtue of his divinity ; hence, neither, strictly speaking, divine nor human. 
In Heidegger, likewise, the Da-sein that is revealed in the Er-eignis is a "Between" in 
between the divine and the human. Now while it is true that some mutations of 
gnosticism look upon the Christ as an intermediate being, there are other characteris-
tics of gnosticism which Heidegger clearly does not share. Heidegger's animadver-
sions to subjectivity indicate a strong reaction against any notion of esoteric knowl-
edge or gnosis in this connection. Similarly, often characteristic of gnosticism in a 
Christological context is the view that the death of the Christ was merely apparent. 
Heidegger's emphasis on the death of Da-sein, and the most awe-filled (furchbarste) 
rejoicing attendant upon the dying of a God, death as the greatest testimony (hôchste 
Zeugnis) of Seyn would certainly run counter to such a view (Beitràge, p. 230). 
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Heidegger develops his own terminology in the formulation of his Christology. 
There is a basis in the German idealist tradition for some of his choices of words, as 
has been noted. His program of getting God out of metaphysics and being out of 
theology is taken care of with the new "ontological difference" between Sein and 
Seyn. Seyn is not God, but rather, as I read Heidegger, that which is revealed in the 
revelation of Seyn in Da-sein. Schelling, in his version of the Trinity in terms of the 
three potencies, has the Father (the first potency) as the Seyn of the Son. In Heidegger 
Seyn is the divine side of the "in between." One may wonder what has happened to 
the Father — as well as the Spirit — in the Heideggerian "Trinity." 
I realize that this reading of Heidegger's Beitràge as containing his Christology is 
a controversial one. It will be controversial for both Heideggerians and anti-
Heideggerians. Heideggerians prefer to think of Heidegger as theologically neutral, 
even an atheist. Anti-Heideggerians see him as an unrepentant Nazi. So how can he 
have a Christology ? To the Heideggerians it may be pointed out that the Freiburg 
philosopher has always been a theist with a privative alpha, an a-theist. To the anti-
Heideggerians it may be said that even an unrepentant Nazi — perhaps especially an 
unrepentant Nazi — has need of salvation. There is the remark Heidegger made in the 
Der Spiegel interview : "Only a God can yet still save us."42 
42. "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten" (Spiegel-Gesprâch, 23. IX. 66 ; Der Spiegel, 30 [1976] Nr. 23, p. 193-
219). 
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